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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Jacobsen's brief does not construe the facts in the light most favorable to Martinez, 
the non-moving party, and fails to address numerous facts in the record that, taken as a 
whole, demonstrate a question of fact as to the dispositive issues in this appeal. 
A defendant need only have exercised "some degree" of control over the injury-
causing aspect of the job in order to bring Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts into play. Unlike the defendant in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322, 
who did nothing more than ask the plaintiff to erect a pipe and then go back inside, 
Jacobsen contractually assumed sole responsibility for providing a safe worksite, agreed 
to review construction methods and advise of any that did not meet acceptable standards, 
and undertook other responsibilities directly relating to the safety of all persons working 
on the site, including subcontractors' employees. 
The voluntary assumption of such duties by contract in itself constituted "active" 
or "affirmative" participation in the steel erection process. However, Jacobsen also 
participated further by imposing mandatory safety requirements specific to the steel 
workers, imposing a 100-percent tie off requirement while approving, at least implicitly, a 
four-foot gap where no tie-off was possible, citing Steel Deck for various safety issues, 
assigning a full-time superintendent whose duties (by his own admission) included safety 
and fall protection, monitoring weather and hazardous natural conditions, and in 
numerous other ways. At the very least, a reasonably jury could conclude that active 
participation occurred under these facts. The cases cited in Thompson, most of which 
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were not resolved until after trial, further demonstrate that dismissal of this action was 
premature. 
With respect to Jacobsen's argument that it acted reasonably as a matter of law, or 
that any breach of duty by it was not a proximate cause of Martinez's accident, those 
arguments should not be considered in the first instance because they were not properly 
raised below. In any event, issues of breach and causation - especially in a case like this 
- are nearly always reserved for the finder of fact. 
ARGUMENT 
L INTRODUCTION 
Rather than construing the facts in the light most favorable to Martinez as required 
on review of a summary judgment, much of Jacobsen's fact statement reads like a closing 
argument. "Plaintiff liked working overtime," Jacobsen says, and the accident was his 
own fault anyway for not deciding on his own to come off the beam, or for untying his 
lanyard when he got to the gap (even though he had no choice). (See Br. Appellee, pp. 
13-16). Jacobsen's approach is inappropriate in the context of a summary judgment. 
In Martinez's opening brief, evidence in the record was summarized which, taken 
as a whole, raises a jury question on the issue of Jacobsen's contractual or actual control 
over the injury-causing aspects of the UPC job. Only if reasonable minds could not view 
those facts differently can the judgment be sustained. As the non-moving party below, 
Martinez is entitled to have all properly supported facts and reasonable inferences 
therefrom construed in the light most favorable to his position. 
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Jacobsen's brief fails to do that. Indeed, Jacobsen does not even acknowledge 
many of the facts discussed in Martinez's brief. For example, Jacobsen states that 
"Plaintiffs factual assertions upon which he claims the existence of a duty" consist only 
of five facts. (Br. Appellee at 24). It is perplexing how Jacobsen can say that, 
considering that Martinez spent 17 pages of his opening brief outlining the record 
evidence that supports his theory of retained control. (See Br. Appellant at 6-17, 22-24, 
26-27). * 
Jacobsen's brief also states as fact other propositions that are strongly disputed. 
Examples include: 
• Jacobsen asserts that the gap in the safety cable was perhaps only three feet 
wide, rather than four. (Br. Appellee, p. 12). However, testimony below was that the gap 
Apart from just those "5" (which Jacobsen phrases in a rather self-serving way), 
the facts include several express contract provisions, Jacobsen's assignment of a full-time 
on-site superintendent and manager whose duties included ensuring jobsite safety, 
Jacobsen's directions to Steel Deck on tie offs and related safety matters prior to the 
accident, Jacobsen's safety program, including steel erection-specific directions, 
Jacobsen's holding of a safety meeting with the steel workers and its requirement of other 
safety meetings, Jacobsen's mandatory safety checklist and imposition of specific safety 
procedures on subcontractors, Jacobsen's inspections of the worksite for safety hazards 
and citations of Steel Deck and other subcontractors, the admission by Jacobsen's project 
superintendent and manager that jobsite safety was their responsibility, Jacobsen's 
agreement to determine natural hazards on the worksite and monitor weather and its 
recognition of those duties when it shut down the site for wind conditions earlier, 
Jacobsen's exertion of pressure on steel workers employees to the point where they could 
reasonably conclude they were not free to make independent decisions regarding weather 
conditions, etc. (See Br. Appellant at 6-17, 22-24, 26-27). 
Jacobsen's brief also contains a few outright inaccuracies. For example, plaintiff 
Russell Martinez was not the person in charge at Truco except when the owner, his uncle 
Perry Trujillo, was not on site. (R. 437-438). 
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was four feet. (R. 377-378). (Jacobsen's basis for trying to shorten the distance 
apparently is an expert's guesstimate from looking at photographs. (R. 550)). Whatever 
a jury would conclude on this issue, Jacobsen's repeated reference to a "three to four feet" 
gap is but one illustration of it construing testimony in the light most favorable to itself, 
rather than Martinez, non-moving party. 
• Jacobsen says that the "three to four foot" gap is "consistent with industry 
standard," and that "looking up from the ground, the safety cable system appeared to be 
installed properly." (Br. Appellee at 12). This effort to depict the gap as reasonable as a 
matter of law is contradicted by the testimony of Martinez's expert witness, a general 
contractor, and other witnesses who said it was improper. (See Br. Appellant at 21, 26-
27). 
• "[Plaintiff] fell and was injured on the job in part because he was violating his 
company's rule and not using fall protection," Jacobsen says, and "Martinez violated that 
[tie-off] rule". (Br. Appellee at 2, 4). These statements are directly contradicted by 
testimony that Martinez was indeed tied off until the moment when he no longer could 
(because of the gap). (See Br. Appellant at 25, also id at 16 n. 6). 
• "Under the arrangement with Masco, Inc., Steel Deck Erectors and Truco took 
on the responsibility for safety equipment and procedures in the steel erection process." 
(Br. Appellee at 4). That, of course, is one of the most hotly contested issues in this case: 
Who assumed what responsibilities on the work site? Moreover, even if the steel 
subcontractor assumed some duties, that would not vitiate Jacobsen's own duties. A jury 
could find that Truco and Martinez and Jacobsen all contributed to the injury. The jury 
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would then assign percentages to each of the parties it deemed at fault. That is what 
special verdicts are for. 
• Jacobsen states as fact that Martinez was in the best position to decide that he 
should quit working because of the wind. (Br. Appellee at 16). But would a jury relieve 
of all responsibility the sophisticated entity who, as part of its bid, agreed to inspect the 
job site for natural conditions that might affect working conditions, including the 
location, layout, and nature of the project site and surrounding areas, and who knew that 
the area posed special high wind risks? (See Br. Appellant at 22-23). Russell Martinez 
had never worked in such high winds before, but Jacobsen's Project Superintendent 
(Randy Brady) had - on that very site just three months earlier, when he ordered it shut 
down due to gale force winds. 
Jacobsen does not acknowledge any of those facts in its brief. Nor does it mention 
Brady's admission that he would have stopped the work if he had realized the winds were 
too strong, or Jacobsen's failure to provide a wind-measuring device on a site known to 
pose an unusually high risk of winds, or its own employees' testimony that Brady was 
responsible to monitor weather on the job site and that it was up to him whether to stop 
work because of weather conditions, depending on whether he thought it was an "unsafe 
condition at that point." (See Br. Appellant at 23-24). 
Could a jury also find that steel workers reasonably believed they would be in 
trouble with Jacobsen if they stopped working? The answer has to be yes. Jacobsen had 
gotten itself into a severe time crunch by failing to ensure adequate steel supplies on the 
job, which put it in danger of breaching its contract with UPC, and it pressured the steel 
5 
workers accordingly. Jacobsen's brief doesn't mention its "fast track" contract 
obligation, or the delays in the steel erection, or the pressure it put on the steel workers 
because the delay was by then its No. 1 concern, but a reasonable jury could read between 
those lines. (See Br. Appellant at 17-20, 24). 
Jacobsen's brief also contains various errors by omission. For example: 
• Jacobsen states that its Safety Director, John Hymel, was not on site every day 
(Br. Appellee at 9), but fails to mention that its Project Superintendent, Randy Brady, and 
its full-time Project Manager, Larry Smith, were on site full-time every day. (See Br. 
Appellant at 8). 
• Jacobsen cites as "fact" that job site safety was not part of Brady's job 
assignment, citing a single page of Brady's deposition. (See Br. Appellee at 7). 
However, the cited testimony actually says that looking out for safety issues wasn't his 
"main" job. (R. 330). Brady testified on the next page of his deposition and elsewhere, 
as did Project Manager Smith, that Brady did in fact have responsibilities for safety on the 
work site. (See R. 330-31 and Br. Appellant at 6-7, 15-17). 
• Jacobsen notes that it provided a safety checklist to all subcontractors. (Br. 
Appellee at 8). It fails to mention, though, that it required a separate meeting with the 
steel erection workers, that it issued mandatory, specific directions related exclusively to 
the steel erection process, and that it cited Steel Deck for certain steel-related safety 
issues both before and after the accident. (See Br. Appellant at 9-10, 14-15). 
• Jacobsen states as purported fact (without any evidentiary support; R. 260 is just 
a copy of the subcontract provision), that paragraph 2.C.8 of the subcontract, in which 
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Jacobsen required the installation of safety railing cable at roof openings, "does not relate 
to the part of the job where the accident occurred." (Br. Appellee, p. 8). Yet after the 
accident, Jacobsen cited Steel Deck for failing to have the safety railings at roof openings. 
(R. 301). These seemingly inconsistent interpretations - pre-litigation vs. post-litigation 
- illustrate that the application of this provision is far from clear, let alone an 
uncontroverted "fact". 
II. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO 
WHETHER JACOBSEN RETAINED SOME DEGREE OF 
CONTROL OVER THE STEEL ERECTORS' SAFETY. 
A. Introduction. 
The statement of issues in Jacobsen's brief reveals a basic flaw in its position: To 
rule for Jacobsen requires the Court to make certain factual assumptions or findings, 
which is improper on appeal from a summary judgment. Jacobsen defines the principal 
issue as: 
In a circumstance such as this, where plaintiff, as the employee of a 
subcontractor, failed to follow safe work procedures and caused injury to himself 
did the general contractor, Jacobsen Construction, actively participate in 
plaintiffs work so that a duty to protect plaintiff from his own errors arose under 
the standard established by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thompson v. 
Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999)? 
(Br. Appellee at 1) (emphasis added). 
As suggested by Jacobsen itself, in order to sustain the trial court's ruling, this 
Court must, at a minimum, accept contested factual assumptions as to the circumstances 
of plaintiffs accident, whether the plaintiff failed to follow safe work procedures, 
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whether the plaintiff caused the injury to himself, and whether Jacobsen "actively 
participated" in the steel erection process. 
That Jacobsen is asking the Court to make such assumptions is reinforced by the 
first and last sentences in its Summary of Argument: "Plaintiffs injury in this case is 
self-caused. . . . In sum, plaintiff, has caused his own injury by failing to follow 
established safety procedures." (Br. Appellee at 17, 20). In between, Jacobsen sets about 
to convince the Court that the accident was entirely Martinez's fault. (E.g., Br. Appellee 
at 17-18, 20). The difficulty with that argument - repeated throughout Jacobsen's brief-
is that questions of fault are quintessentially a matter for the finder of fact. 
B. A fact issue exists as to whether, and to what extent, Jacobsen retained a 
right of control over the injury-causing aspects of the job. 
It bears reminding that, for a duty to be recognized under Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 414, a defendant need only have retained "some degree" of control over the 
injury-causing aspect of the job. It need not be exclusive. (Hence, Jacobsen's assertion 
that Steel Deck/Truco also assumed some control is immaterial; it is up to the jury to sort 
out what percentages of fault lie with either.) 
That a fact issue exists on this point becomes clear from a review of Thompson v. 
Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322, and cases cited therein. As Jacobsen does not dispute, 
the owner in Thompson had no involvement whatsoever in the construction process. In 
fact, the only control even alleged by the plaintiff was "requesting that [the plaintiff] and 
Jensen erect the pipe when they were not obligated to do so, [and] directing them to 
install the pipe over the existing pipe stub . . . ." 1999 UT 22, If 8. It is hard to imagine a 
8 
more clear case for not applying Section 414. This case, however, is more akin to those 
cited in Thompson that required a trial to determine the facts. 
For example, jury verdicts against defendants under Section 414 were upheld in 
Grahn v. Tosco Corp., 68 Cal.Rptr. 806, 819 (Cal. App. 1997), and Redinger v. Living, 
Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985), both cited in Thompson. Jacobsen does not attempt to 
distinguish Grahn, and its discussion of Redinger overlooks the Texas court's dispositive 
conclusion that, in the case before it, "there [was] evidence that [the defendant] retained 
the power to direct the order in which the work was to be done and to forbid the work 
being done in a dangerous manner." 689 S.W.2d at 418. There is evidence in this case to 
the same effect - indeed, Jacobsen does not dispute that it had both the power to direct 
and to forbid. 
Lewis v. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 825 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1992, in bank), also upheld a 
jury verdict against a general contractor under Section 414, but Jacobsen suggests that its 
ruling hinged upon the fact that the general contractor directed the workers to knock 
down some plywood that contributed to the injury. (See Br. Appellee at 29). To make 
this assertion, one must skip over several pages of analysis in Lewis, in which the court 
held that the contractors voluntarily assumed contractual obligations were sufficient to 
establish retained control. 
As recognized in comment (a) to Section 414, "if a general contractor assumes 
affirmative duties with respect to safety, it retains sufficient control to be held liable 
under § 414 for its negligent exercise of its safety responsibilities," the court noted 
initially. Id at 12, citing Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 211 (Alaska 1982). Lewis then 
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concluded that "[t]he court of appeals improperly disregarded the contractual relationship 
between Riebe and the school district as a factual basis supporting the jury's verdict." Id. 
Noting that in its contract (like Jacobsen's), the contractor assumed responsibility for 
providing a safe worksite, the court held: 
These contractual provisions not only allowed Riebe to retain control over Garges' 
work by providing it with the authority to stop any work practice it considered 
unsafe, but also imposed upon Riebe an affirmative duty to control Garges' work 
methods in order to insure the safety of everyone at the work site. This right to 
control the work, even if unexercised, meets the criteria for liability under § 414. 
[Citations omitted.] Thus, in contrast to the court of appeals, we believe that the 
safety responsibility undertaken by Riebe in its contract with the school district 
constitutes a sufficient retention of control over Garges' work to subject Riebe to 
liability under § 414. 
Id. at 12-13 (court's emphasis). 
Jacobsen argues that "it makes no sense to require a general contractor, who does 
not have the expertise on site to supervise and regulate the manner and method of work of 
its expert subcontractors." (Br. Appellee at 32). Yet Jacobsen contracted to do just that. 
Accordingly, its contention that Martinez's argument is "contrary to good public policy" 
(Br. Appellee at 32) cannot stand: How can it be contrary to good public policy to require 
a party to live up to obligations that it has voluntarily assumed? 
Moreover, the argument requires this Court to find that Jacobsen did not have on-
site expertise, which is contradicted by the testimony of its two full-time on-site project 
The court also noted: "Because the issue of breach of duty is linked inexorably 
with the question of whether a general contractor has 'retained the control of any part of 
the work,' § 414, we believe that the issue of retained control is also a question of fact 
which ordinarily should be left to the fact finder." Id at 10 (court's emphasis). 
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superintendent/managers, Larry Smith and Randy Brady, and Jacobsen's own 
representation in the contract that it was a large contractor who possessed such expertise. 
The court must also assume that Truco, a comparatively tiny, family-owned 
subcontractor, was an "expert" in 100-percent tie offs, when it is undisputed that it had 
not worked at such heights on any prior jobs, but Jacobsen had. 
If Jacobsen were a business owner who merely asked a contractor to build 
something and then disappeared, this case would be simple. But it isn't — and for good 
reason: Jacobsen was paid to take on more than a passive role, to take on the sole 
responsibility for worksite safety. Having reaped the benefit of assuming those 
obligations, a jury should be allowed to decide whether Jacobsen actually lived up to 
them. 
Jacobsen, however, singles out one phrase from the Utah Supreme Court's 
sentence - "active" participation - and suggests that Section 414 requires that Jacobsen's 
negligence be by commission, not omission. Thus, Jacobsen emphasizes, it did not 
"actively . . . push or in any way cause Mr. Martinez to fall, actively." (See Br. Appellee 
at 19). 
There are four problems with that argument. The first is that Jacobsen omits key 
language from Thompson. The Supreme Court articulated the Section 414 test as whether 
defendants "actively participate in or otherwise exercise affirmative control over the 
manner or method of performance . . . ." 1999 UT 22, f^ 26 (emphasis added). As noted 
infra, this affirmative control can be contractual or actual, and can encompass both acts of 
omission and commission. 
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Second, Jacobsen ignores additional language from Section 414 that elaborates 
upon the meaning of "active participation." For example, the power to direct the manner 
in which the work shall be done, or to "forbid its being done in a manner likely to be 
dangerous to himself or others" may be sufficient to trigger a duty to exercise that power 
with reasonable care. See Section 414 cmt a. Jacobsen does not recognize, let alone 
address, that point in its brief. 
Nor does Jacobsen address this key language from Thompson: "A typical instance 
in which such an exertion of control might occur is 'when a principal contractor entrusts a 
part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman superintends the 
entire job.'" 1999 UT 22,f 21, quoting Section 414 cmt b. Or this: "In such a situation, 
the principal contractor is subject to liability if he fails to prevent the subcontractors from 
doing even the details of the work in a way unreasonably dangerous to others, if he knows 
or by the exercise of reasonable care should know that the subcontractors' work is being 
so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it by exercising the power of control which he 
has retained in himself. . . ." Section 414 cmt b. Whether such circumstances existed in 
this case is disputed and cannot be resolved by motion. 
The third problem with Jacobsen's request that this Court decide as a matter of law 
whether it "actively participated" in fall-protection or related safety issues is that it 
disregards the two distinct forms of active participation cognizable under Section 414. 
Control can be either "contractual" or "actual". See Erwin v. Kern River Gas 
Transmission Co., 1977 WL 804238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (cited in Jacobsen's brief at 
12 
24-26 as accurately stating Utah law) (for purposes of Section 414, control can be either 
contractual or actual, analyzing each theory separately). 
In Erwin, for example, the Texas court (applying Utah law) began its analysis by 
examining the contract to see whether the owner contractually reserved the right to direct, 
control, or superintend the contractor's work. Notably, Kern River's contract contained 
none of the pertinent language found in Jacobson's contract. The only provisions to 
which the Erwins could cite were: 1) a clause allowing the owner to retain 10 percent of 
the amounts invoiced until the project was completed; 2) a provision requiring the 
contractor to fire any employee deemed unsafe or unqualified by Kern River; 3) a 
provision allowing Kern River to stop the contractor's work if it were not being 
performed according to the contract's terms, is risking, threatening, or damaging any 
property, or is not being done safely; and 4) a clause allowing Kern River to terminate the 
contract at will. Id. at *3-4. 
Not surprisingly, the court found those generic provisions insufficient to 
demonstrate that Kern River had contractually reserved a right to participate actively in 
the project. In this case, the contract provisions are far more specific and on point, 
As for "actual" control, the only facts to which the Erwins pointed were general 
economic pressure exerted by the owner and acceleration of the overall work schedule, 
and that Kern River, the owner, designed the right-of-way area in which the plaintiff was 
injured. Unlike Jacobsen, Kern had no on-site supervisors, nor did it profess to have any 
expertise in the construction being done. (Jacobsen, by contrast, procured the UPC job by 
representing itself to be a "relatively large, experienced design/builder and contractor who 
possesses a high level of experience and expertise in the . . . design, construction, 
construction management and superintendence of projects of the size, complexity and 
nature of this particular Project " (R. 284, Contract, Part 2 Addendum, § 15.1(6))). 
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including not only an agreement to be "solely responsible for providing a safe place for 
the performance of the work," but also to "be responsible for all construction means, 
methods, techniques, sequences and procedures . . . ," to review any specified 
construction or installation procedures and to advise of any procedure that deviated from 
acceptable construction practice, and to comply with all safety laws. Jacobsen expressly 
agreed to reiterate its obligations in subcontractors' contracts. (See Br. Appellant at 6-7). 
Jacobsen's brief does not address any of those provisions, with one exception: 
Jacobsen states as fact that the "purpose" of the provision in which Jacobsen agreed to be 
"solely responsible for providing a safe place for the performance of the work" is just to 
relieve the owner of any responsibility for safety, and that Jacobsen wasn't really 
assuming sole responsibility even though that is what the contract says. Apart from the 
lack of evidentiary support for this supposed "purpose" (R. 285 is just a copy of the 
contract), the contract says what it says and, when combined with the other evidence in 
the case, certainly raises a jury question as to the assumption of duties. 
Finally, Jacobsen's argument fails to recognize that, even under its narrow 
interpretation of "active participation," Martinez has proffered sufficient evidence to go 
to the jury on the extent of Jacobsen's involvement. Of course Martinez does not claim 
that Jacobsen shoved him off the beam, but no such showing is required for a Section 414 
claim. (One would hardly need to examine Section 414 as a basis for liability if the 
defendant's employee pushed the plaintiff off the beam; normal respondeat superior 
principles would apply in such an instance.) 
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But a jury could find that Jacobsen affirmatively exerted control over the steel 
erection process (including fall protection) by, among other things, directing Steel Deck 
to implement a tie-off system without giving it adequate direction, and implicitly 
approving the four-foot gap. (See Br. Appellant at 37). The same conclusion could be 
reached with respect to wind/weather conditions. Jacobsen indisputably participated -
exclusively, in fact - in monitoring hazardous natural condition and weather. Id. 
Likewise, Jacobsen "participated in" (by imposing) the time pressures that, as a practical 
matter, limited the steel workers' ability to quit working in the face of adverse weather. 
Id 
In asking this Court to declare that no jury could reasonably find some degree of 
retained control over fall protection, wind/weather, or ability to discontinue working, 
Jacobsen relies on Hooker v. Dept. of Transportation, 27 Cal. 4th 198, 38 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 
2002). California, however, has articulated a different standard than Utah for general 
contractor liability. In California, a plaintiff must show not only the retention of a right of 
control, but also that the defendant "induced injurious action or inaction through actual 
direction, reliance on the hirer, or otherwise." 27 Cal. 4th at 211. 
Hooker would not support Jacobsen's position under the facts of this case in any 
event. Even under California law, a jury could find that the time pressures imposed by 
Jacobsen, along with its express assumption of responsibility for job site safety, its actions 
in writing up steelworkers on occasion for not tying off but not for having a four-foot gap 
in the safety cable, etc., "induced injurious action or inaction." Moreover, Hooker noted 
that there was no evidence in that case that the defendant "actually directed PBE or any of 
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the other subcontractors on the job to alleviate an unsafe condition," ki - unlike 
Jacobsen, which admits that it did so on several occasions, including fall protection. 
Perhaps the best indicator of how California would read Hooker on the "active" 
element comes from its own Court of Appeal. In Ray v. Silverado Constructors, 120 
Cal.Rptr.2d 251 (Cal. App. 2002), review denied, the defendants asserted arguments 
under Hooker reminiscent of Jacobsen's in this case. "[The defendants] fixate on the 
words 'affirmative conduct' and discount the words 'affirmatively contributed,'" the 
court wrote. "They do so despite the fact the court in Hooker made clear that an 
affirmative contribution is what is key. The Court explained that an 'affirmative 
contribution need not always be in the form of actively directing a contractor or 
contractor's employee. There will be times when a hirer will be liable for its omissions. 
For example, if the hirer promises to undertake a particular safety measure, then the 
hirer's negligent failure to do so should result in liability if such negligent leads to an 
employee injury." Id at 257-58, quoting Hooker, 27 Cal. 4th at 212 n. 3 (emphasis added 
except as to word "contribution"). 
In the end, Jacobsen's argument must fail because only a jury can decide who did 
what when and why on the UPC job site. Ironically, Jacobsen devotes two pages of its 
brief to Hale v. Danny's Construction Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 389, 2000 WL 358409 (10th 
Cir. 2000), which it says involved "essentially identical" facts to those here. What 
Jacobsen omits, though, is that the judgment in that case followed a trial with findings of 
fact by the court "after hearing the testimony, making credibility findings, and reviewing 
the documentary evidence . . . ." Id., *2 (emphasis added). That is all Martinez asks: to 
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be allowed to present his evidence to a factfinder, as the plaintiff did in Hale. See id, * 1 
("The issue of whether a general contractor has retained sufficient control over the 
performance of work is a question of fact which should ordinarily be left to the fact 
finder"). 
IV, NO CHALLENGE TO PROXIMATE CAUSE OR BREACH 
OF DUTY WAS PRESERVED BELOW, AND AN ISSUE OF 
FACT EXISTS REGARDING THOSE ISSUES IN ANY 
EVENT. 
A. The argument was not properly presented below. 
In his opening brief, Martinez pointed out that Jacobsen brought its motion for 
summary judgment solely upon the alleged absence of a legal duty, and never raised the 
issue of proximate cause or whether it was negligent until its reply memorandum. (See 
Br. Appellant at 1-2, 39). 
Jacobsen does not address the issue of preservation anywhere in its brief, nor can 
it: A simple review of the parties' memoranda below demonstrates that the issue was not 
raised until after Martinez had filed his memorandum opposing the motion on the only 
grounds that were raised. (See R. 177, 214, and 544). Accordingly, Point II of 
Jacobsen's brief, which pertains solely to the unpreserved issue of causation and 
negligence, should be disregarded. 
B. An issue of fact exists in any event. 
It is hard to decide which issue is more often declared to be one for the finder of 
fact in Utah: whether a defendant was negligent, or whether its negligence was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. See Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, If 9, 
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67 P.3d 1017 ("Whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care is 
generally a question for the jury . . . ."), Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 
2000 UT App 225, 8 P.3d 1037 f^ 5 ("Ordinarily, the question of negligence is a question 
of fact for the jury; thus, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the 
most clear instances"); and Rose, supra ("proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact 
for the jury"), Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 
1991) ("It is well established that the question of proximate cause is generally reserved 
for the jury"), affd, 862 P.3d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, Jacobsen argues that, even if it had a duty to exercise reasonable care 
for Russell Martinez's safety on the work site, this Court should take upon itself the task 
of deciding that Jacobsen acted entirely reasonably. In undertaking that assignment, the 
first thing the Court would have to do is disregard the testimony of Martinez's expert 
witness, Paul Gogulski, that Jacobsen breached the standard of care. (See Br. Appellant 
at 26-27). The Court would then have to decide (while rejecting the testimony of steel 
workers who were there) that the gap was only three feet wide, not four. 
The Court's next task would be to decide how "ferocious" the gale force winds 
were that day, whether the conditions made it unsafe to work—and so forth. The Court 
would then need to apportion fault by deciding which parties contributed to the accident 
and in what percentages. The factual barriers to making such rulings as a matter of law 
were addressed in Martinez's opening brief, and will not be reiterated here. (See Br. 
Appellant at 39-40). Issues of breach and causation in a case like this are inherently 
factual, and should be resolved at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff/appellant hereby respectfully requests the 
Court to reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment, and to remand the 
case for trial. 
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